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Abstract 
During the last decade the structure and scope of fundamental rights protection in the EU have 
dramatically changed. Ever-closer links have been established between the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU, and their respective jurisprudence. Moreover, the Lisbon 
Treaty has elevated the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to the status of EU primary law and 
imposed an obligation on the EU to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
(Article 6 (2) EU). How will the accession impact on the relationship between the Courts?  
On the one hand, the ECHR and the case law of the Strasbourg Court have of course always been 
an important source of inspiration for the CJEU ever since it started to develop its case law on 
fundamental rights protection. The Convention as an instrument of international law did not directly 
bind the EC/Union. Yet, in practice the approach of the Luxemburg Court has come to be quite close 
to Strasbourg by way of increasing its acceptance and reference to the latter’s case law. And this 
influence has been reciprocated. This judicial dialogue is not just a matter of judicial diplomacy. 
Often, the references to each other’s case law reflect a real mutual impact. The CJEU has, on occasion, 
invoked the evolution of the case law of the Strasbourg Court to adapt its own interpretation of the 
scope of fundamental rights’ protection. Also the Strasbourg Court has sometimes referred to an 
evolution of the Luxembourg Court case law as an argument to further develop its own interpretation 
of the Convention. There is more to be said about this mutually beneficial effect of the cooperation 
between both Courts through their case law. Indeed, both Courts have been instrumental to 
strengthening each other’s legal system.  
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Introductory remark 
During the last decade the structure and scope of fundamental rights protection on the level of the 
EU has dramatically changed. Ever-closer links have been established between the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR or Strasbourg Court) and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU or Luxemburg 
Court), and their respective case law. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty has elevated the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights to the status of EU primary law and imposed an obligation on the EU to accede to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Article 6 (2) EU). How will the accession 
impact on the relationship between both Courts? Allow me a few, somewhat speculative remarks. 
The relationships between the Luxemburg and the Strasbourg Court as they stand 
The ECHR and the case law of the Strasbourg Court have of course always been an important 
source of inspiration for the CJEU as from the days it started to develop its case law on fundamental 
rights protection.
1
 The Convention as an instrument of international law did not directly bind the 
EC/Union. Yet, in practice the approach of the Luxemburg Court has come quite close to that by way 
of increasing its acceptance and reference to the Strasbourg case law. This influence has been 
reciprocated. Indeed, an intensive dialogue has developed between the Courts through their case law. 
In its decision in the Kadi case,
2
 the CJEU, in claiming jurisdiction over Community instruments 
implementing Security Council Resolutions on the blacklisting of presumed terrorists, extensively 
invoked the human rights’ case law of the Strasbourg Court. The Strasbourg Court referred to the Kadi 
judgment in the Nada case which dealt with similar questions.
3
 The Strasbourg Court had referred to 
the EU Charter of fundamental rights as to a relevant interpretative material for a dynamic 
interpretation of the Convention, already at the time when the Charter was not yet of a binding nature
4
 
and before the CJEU started doing so. Since then, the ECtHR has regularly referred to the Charter.
5
 A 
recent article by Anderson and Murphy opines that “the case law of the Strasbourg Court to date 
suggests a willingness to review the level of protection in the light of the Charter”.6  
This judicial dialogue is not just a matter of judicial diplomacy. Often, the references to each 
other’s case law reflect a very real and mutual impact. The CJEU has on occasion invoked the 
evolution of the case law of the Strasbourg Court to adapt its own interpretation of the scope of 
fundamental rights’ protection. For instance, on the question of whether Article 8 of the Convention 
also grants a right of privacy to companies so as to allow them to challenge access to their premises by 
Commission inspectors in competition law cases, the Court gave a negative answer in the Hoechst 
case of 1989.
7
 However, in its Roquette Frères judgment of 2002,
8
 the CJEU reversed this 
interpretation, invoking the development in that regard of the case-law of the Strasbourg Court. 
9
  
                                                     
1
 CJEU, Rutili , Case 36/75 (1975) ECR 1219 and Hauer, Case 44/79 (1979) ECR 3727. 
2
 CJEU, Kadi, Case C-402/05P (2008) ECR I-6351. 
3
 ECtHR, Nada, judgment of 12 September 2012, no. 10593/08. 
4
 ECtHR, Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, no. 28957/95. 
5
 See for a listing of these cases the Bulletin published on the website of the CJEU (curia), Reflets n° 1/2013 Edition spéciale 
Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’UE, pp. 2-7. 
6
 D.Anderson and C.C. Murphy, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights” in A.Biondi, P.Eeckhout, S.Ripley (eds.), EU Law 
After Lisbon, Oxford, University Press, 2012, p.155 at 178. 
7
 CJEU, Hoechst AG v Commission, Joined Cases C-46/87 and 227/88, ECR 1989 – 2859.  
8
 CJEU, Roquette Frères, C-94/00 (2002) ECR I-9011. 
9
 ECtHR, Niemietz v Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, no. 13710/88 and Colas Est v France, judgment of 16 April 
2002, no. 37971/97. 
A more recent, telling example of this cooperation through the case law is given by the CJEU 
judgment of 21 December 2011 in an asylum case - N.S.
10
 In that judgment the Court based its 
assessment of the situation in Greece with regard to the treatment of asylum seekers on the factual 
assessment made by the Strasbourg Court in its M.S.S. judgment of 21 January 2011.
11
  
The Strasbourg Court has also sometimes referred to an evolution of the Luxembourg Court case 
law as an argument to further develop its own interpretation of the Convention. The judgment of that 
Court (Grand Chamber) in the case of Scoppola (No 2) v. Italy provides an example.
12
 The Court, 
reversing the earlier case law, interpreted the principle of legality enshrined in Article 7 of the 
Convention as requiring the retroactive application of the more lenient penalty referring also to the 
Berlusconi judgment of the CJEU to the same effect.
13
  
There is more to be said about this mutually beneficial effect of the cooperation between both 
Courts through their case law. Indeed, both Courts have been instrumental to strengthening each 
other’s legal system.  
In the Hornsby case of 1997,
14
 the Strasbourg Court indirectly condemned the non-execution of the 
CJEU judgment as contrary to Article 6 of the Convention. It has also ruled that a refusal by a 
national, last instance court to use the preliminary reference procedure might violate the right to a fair 
trial under Article 6 of the Convention if such refusal appears to be arbitrary.
15
 This approach was 
recently confirmed and further strengthened in a judgment of 20 September 2011 in the case of Ullens 
de Schooten and Rezabek v Belgium. The Strasbourg Court in this case required that a last instance 
court motivates the refusal to make a preliminary reference.
16
  
In the same vein, the position of the Convention in the EU and its Member States will be reinforced 
in such cases in which Convention rights are accepted as fundamental rights of the EU. Indeed, when 
it comes to the enforcement of these rights within the Member States, they will benefit from the 
safeguards of the Union’s legal system (direct effect, supremacy). So, the respect for fundamental 
rights on the part of Member State’s authorities might be even more effectively enforced in Germany 
through the Union’s legal system than on the mere basis of the authority of the decisions of the 
Strasbourg Court as accepted by the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
17
 
It seems therefore fair to conclude, that the cooperation between the CJEU and the Strasbourg 
Court, as it has developed over the years, has been beneficial to each Court and more generally to the 
level of human rights’ protection.  
A special feature of this cooperative relationship is represented, of course, by the Bosphorus case 
law of the Strasbourg Court. It demonstrates, one might say, a form of judicial comity vis-à-vis the 
                                                     
10
 CJEU, N.S., Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 not yet reported. 
11
 ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no. 30696/09. See for an asylum cases in which the Strasbourg Court took into 
account the case law of the Luxemburg Court (CJEU Elgafaji, Case C- 465/07 (2009) ECR I-921): ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi 
v United Kingdom, judgment of 28 June 2011, no.2700/10. 
12
 ECtHR, Scoppola, judgment of 17 September 2009, no. 10249/03. 
13
 CJEU, Berlusconi, Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02, and C-403/02 (2005) ECR I-3624. 
14
 ECtHR, Hornsby, judgment of 19 March 1997, no. 18357/91. 
15
 ECtHR, John v Germany, decision of 13 February 2007, no. 15073/03, and Herma v Germany, decision of 8 December 
2009, no. 54193/07. 
16
  ECtHR, Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v Belgium, decision of 20 September 2011, no. 3989/07 and 38353/07. 
17
 See the decision of that Court in the case of Görgülü, 14 October 2004, 2BvR 1481/04. According to the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, German Courts are not de iure bound to respect a judgment of the Strasbourg Court. They 
should, however, duly consider or take into account such a judgment. See more generally Georg Ress, “The Effect of 
Decisions and Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the Domestic Legal Order”, Texas International 
Law Journal 2005, p. 359. 
  
 
CJEU as to the level of protection of fundamental rights granted by the latter.
18
 Indeed, in its 
Bosphorus judgment the Strasbourg Court accepted the protection granted by the CJEU as, in 
principle, equivalent to the protection ensured under the Convention as interpreted by the Strasbourg 
Court, justifying a more remote or subsidiary control by that Court as to the respect of fundamental 
rights by the European Union. The Bosphorus judgment has since then been repeatedly confirmed by 
the Strasbourg Court.
19
 However, the judgment of 6 December 2012 in Michaud v France
20
 seems to 
limit the applicability of the Bosphorus presumption to cases in which the CJEU has, in fact, been able 
to exercise its control. This case has not been referred to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. 
The cooperation through the case law is matched by an informal cooperation between both Courts 
through regular informal meetings in which recent developments in the case law are discussed. After 
such a meeting in January 2011, the Presidents of both Courts issued a Joint Communication. This was 
a novelty, but could be considered as anticipating the expectation expressed by Declaration No. 2 
annexed to the Lisbon Treaty stating that the dialogue between both Courts could be reinforced after 
accession. And indeed the Communication addressed more particularly an issue related to the 
accession (see infra). 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The Charter strengthens the relationship between the EU legal system and that of the Convention. 
With its entering into force, the Convention has now become a source of law - of binding law - within 
the EU legal system. This follows from Article 52(3) of the Charter, which obliges the EU to respect 
the Strasbourg Convention as a minimum level of protection in case, and in so far as Charter rights 
correspond to Convention rights. According to the explanations of this provision, “the level of 
protection afforded by the Charter may never be lower than that guaranteed by the ECHR”. The 
corresponding rights have been usefully listed in the explanations.
21
 This means that already now the 
Convention, as to the substance of fundamental rights, is a part of EU law and even of primary law, 
the Charter forming part of the Treaty. Consequently, this unilateral commitment confers on the 
Convention rights a higher status than would normally be the case with regard to treaties concluded by 
the Union by virtue of Article 216 (2) FEU. These treaties rank somewhere in between primary and 
secondary EU law.  
Moreover, in so far as the Convention may now be considered a part of EU primary law, this will 
also have to imply the interpretation given by the Strasbourg Court to these corresponding rights. The 
recitals of the Charter and its explanations seem to confirm this by explicitly referring to the case law 
of the ECtHR. So, one might say that as from December 1
st
 2009 the EU has made itself subject 
(again: unilaterally) to the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court. The most recent case law of the CJEU 
seems to endorse this interpretation of Article 52 (3) of the Charter.
22
  
                                                     
18
 ECtHR, Bosphorus Airways v Ireland, decision of 30June 2005, no. 45036/98. 
19
 E.g. ECtHR, Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij v The Netherlands, decision of 20 
January 2009, no. 13645/05. 
20
 ECtHR, Michaud v France, decision 6 December 2012, no. 12323/11 
21
 The relevance of the explanations for the interpretation of the Charter is explicitly underlined by Article 6 (1) EU and 
Article 52 (7) of the Charter. Unfortunately however, most official editions of the Treaties do not produce the text of the 
explanations which have been published in OJ 2007, C 303. 
22
 CJEU, McB, case C-400/10 PPU (2010) ECR I-8965, para. 53; DEB, case C-279/09 (2010) ECR I-13849, para. 35; Dereci, 
case C-256/11, judgment of 15 November 2011, para. 70; Melloni, case C-399/11, judgment of 26 February 2013, para. 
50; Arango Jaramillo, case C-334/12, RX-II, judgment of 28 February 2013, para. 43. The last three judgments have not 
yet been reported. 
Since entering into force, the EU Charter of fundamental rights has come to play a rapidly 
increasing role in the case law of the CJEU.
23
 Indeed, it has now become, and logically so, the first and 
main source of reference for the Court when it is confronted with fundamental rights issues,
24
 which is 
increasingly the case. The objective of the Charter to make already existing EU fundamental rights 
more visible appears to be successfully met, in light of the litigation before the Union Courts, 
including the preliminary procedure, which is becoming more fundamental rights focused. 
However, the primary focus on the Charter might induce the Court to place less emphasis on the 
Convention and the relevant case law of the Strasbourg Court. And indeed in some recent decisions of 
the Grand Chamber (Sky Österreich,
25
 Akerberg Fransson,
26
 ZZ
27
), the Court has refrained from any 
reference to that case law, apart from a limited exception in the ZZ judgment, where such references 
would have been welcome and to be expected in line with normal practice. Fortunately, in each of 
these cases the Advocate General had made abundant reference to Convention case law. Earlier 
judgments might have already given indications of a possible policy change in this regard. In Otis
28
 the 
Grand Chamber, following a precedent set by the Second Chamber in Chalkor,
29
 stated with regard to 
the principle of effective judicial protection (a general principle of EU law, embodied as well in 
Article 6 (1) of the ECHR) that because it was now secured by Article 47 of the Charter, the reference 
should be made only to that Article. In Radu,
30
 the Grand Chamber again refers to these precedents but 
omitting the word “only”. Indeed, in other recent judgments, also of the Grand Chamber, one again 
finds references to the Convention and the Strasbourg case law.
31
   
One can understand that the Court, now that the Charter has become a binding instrument, prefers 
to refer to the Charter in the first place as the main source of fundamental rights in the EU legal 
system. However, that should certainly not imply that the case law of the Strasbourg Court has become 
less relevant for the interpretation of the relevant rights and be less worthy of reference. As it was 
quite pertinently expressed in a Fourth Chamber judgment of 28 February 2013,
32
 “reference must be 
made” to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights “in accordance with Article 52(3) of 
the Charter”. Or to quote Advocate General Sharpston in Gascogne:33 “By virtue of Article 52(3) of 
the Charter, since the rights guaranteed by Article 47 (Charter) correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
ECHR, their meaning and scope are to be construed in the light of Articles 6(1) and 13 ECHR. Thus, 
the criteria developed by the Strasbourg Court in interpreting those provisions should be applied (…)”. 
One may perhaps add that a change of judicial policy in this regard would risk to have a negative 
impact on the cooperation between both Courts and in any event be difficult to reconcile with the 
ambition of reinforcing the existing dialogue between both Courts after the accession of the EU to the 
Convention, as expressed by the Declaration on Article 6(2) EU annexed to the Lisbon Treaty.  
                                                     
23
 For an overview see A.Rosas and H.Kaila, “L’application de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne par 
la Cour de justice: un premier bilan”, Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 1/11, p. 1; Th. Von Danwitz and K.Paraschas, “A 
fresh start for the Charter- Fundamental questions on the application of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights”, 
Fordham Law Journal 2012, pp. 1396 ff.; C. Ladenburger, “Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon-The 
interaction between the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention of Human Rights and National 
Constitutions”, FIDE 2012 Institutional Report. 
24
 See for instance CJEU, DEB, case C-279/09, cit.  
25
 CJEU, Sky Österreich, C-283/11, judgment of 22 January 2013, not yet reported. 
26
 CJEU, Akerberg Fransson, C-617/10, judgment of 26 February 2013, not yet reported. 
27
 CJEU, ZZ, C-300/11, judgment of 4 June 2013, not yet reported. 
28
 CJEU, Otis, C-199/11, judgment of 6 November 2012, not yet reported. 
29
 CJEU, Chalkor, C-386/10P, judgment of 8 December 2011, not yet reported. 
30
 CJEU, Radu, C-396/11, cit. 
31
 For instance, CJEU, Melloni, C-399/11, cit., para. 50. 
32
 CJEU, Arango Jaramillo, C-334/12 RX-II, cit., para. 43. 
33
 C-58/12P Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH, Opinion of 30 May 2013, para. 72, not yet reported. 
  
 
 Accession to the ECHR 
In spite of the close cooperation between the Luxemburg and Strasbourg Courts and the 
incorporation of the substance of the (corresponding) Convention rights by Article 52(3) of the 
Charter, the Lisbon Treaty moreover requires the EU to become a party to the ECHR (Article 6 par.2 
EU). I do not think formal accession is necessary because the present level of fundamental rights 
protection within the EU legal order must be considered insufficient. However, there are other, more 
formal reasons justifying accession.
34
  
First of all, accession would finally achieve the highly desirable integration of the EU in the pan-
European system of human rights protection established by the 47 Member States of the Council of 
Europe. Indeed, it becomes more and more difficult to accept that important issues of human rights 
protection are increasingly withdrawn from the direct jurisdiction of the ECtHR because of the ever-
continuing transfer of rule-making competences from the EU Member States to the EU, a transfer, 
which has still been further increased by the Lisbon Treaty. It is true that someone who considers that 
his/her human rights have been infringed by an EU act might in certain circumstances address his 
complaint to the Strasbourg Court against a Member State or even all Member States.
35
 However, that 
itself is an anomaly: the accused, that is the Union itself, is not able to defend the case, and cannot be 
condemned. And finally, as it is elegantly put in the preamble of the draft accession agreement, 
accession would enhance coherency in human rights protection in Europe.
36
 Indeed, after accession the 
Strasbourg Court could solve a possible conflict between the case laws of the Luxemburg and the 
Strasbourg Court. 
Negotiations on accession started on a technical level in 2010 and produced a first draft in October 
2011.
37
 A second round appeared necessary and was successfully concluded in April 2013.
38
 Draft 
accession instruments are on the table.
39
 The whole negotiation process until now has been remarkably 
transparent. The reports of the negotiating group and the texts of the subsequent versions of the draft 
agreement and the explanatory report were made available on the internet. In my view the negotiators 
                                                     
34
 See also Pieter van Dijk, “Comments on the Accession of the European Union/European Community to the European 
Convention on Human Rights”, European Commission for Democracy through Law, CDL(2007)096, para.2. 
35
 ECtHR, Matthews v United Kingdom, judgment of 18 February 1999, no.24833/94 but see ECtHR, Connolly v 15 Member 
States of the EU, decision of 9 December 2008, no. 73274/01. 
36
 See also the Declaration adopted by the High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Brighton 19 and 20 April 2012 (Brighton Declaration), para. 36. 
37
 See for a first comment: X.Groussot, T.Lock, and L.Pech, “EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights: a 
Legal Assessment of the Draft Accession Agreement of 14th October 2011”, Fondation Robert Schuman, European 
Issues No 28, 7th November 2011; M. Kuijer, “The Accession of the European Union to the ECHR: a gift for the 
ECHR’s 60th anniversary or an unwelcome intruder at the party?”, Amsterdam Law Forum, Vol. 3, no;4, 2011, p. 17; T. 
Lock, “Walking on a tightrope: the draft ECHR Accession Agreement and the autonomy of the EU legal order”, 
CMLRev. 2011, p. 1025; N. O’Meara, “A More Secure Europe of Rights? The European Court of Human Rights, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and EU Accession to the ECHR”, German Law Journal 2011, p. 1813. See more 
generally on the subject of accession: G.Gaja, “Accession to the ECHR”, in Biondi, Eeckhout, Ripley, EU Law after 
Lisbon, cit., p. 180, J-P. Jacqué, “The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms”, CMLRev. 2011, p. 995, B. Smulders, “De drie-pijler structuur van de 
grondrechtenbescherming in de EU: Enkele institutioneelrechtelijke overwegingen omtrent de groeiende complexiteit van 
deze bescherming na Lissabon”, in T.Baumé a.o. (eds), Today’s Multi-layered Legal Order: Current Issues and 
Perspectives, Liber Amicorum in honour of Arjen W.H.Meij, Zutphen 2011, p. 325. 
38
 See R.Böcker, “Gaten dichten Toetreding van de Europese Unie tot het EVRM”, NJB 2013, p. 1560. 
39
 See Draft revised agreement and Draft explanatory report annexed to the Final Report to the CDDH, 47+1(2013)008rev2 
of 10 June 2013. 
should be congratulated. The text of the draft is short, simple and straightforward, which is 
furthermore noticeable taking into account the complexity of some of the issues involved. 
So, the perspectives for accession have brightened but there is still a long way to go. On the side of 
the EU, the European Commission has now asked an opinion of the CJEU about the compatibility of 
the draft agreement with the EU treaties under Article 218 (11) TFEU; the necessary internal EU rules 
with regard to EU decision-making on participation in ECHR procedures and the procedure of prior 
involvement of the CJEU still have to be agreed upon; accession requires a unanimous decision of the 
Council to be approved by the Member States according to their constitutional procedures (Article 
218(8) TFEU) and then finally the Accession instruments must be ratified by all 47 Member States of 
the Council of Europe. 
Prior involvement of the CJEU and the co-respondent mechanism 
Accession of the EU to the Convention raises a number of complex legal issues. Being fully aware 
of that, the authors of the Lisbon Treaty have annexed a special Protocol to that Treaty (No. 8) 
requiring the Accession Treaty, notably, to make provision for preserving the specific characteristics 
of the Union and Union law and to ensure that accession of the Union shall not affect the competences 
of the Union or the powers of its institutions.  
One of these issues more particularly concerns the CJEU.
40
   
The system of human rights protection provided for by the Strasbourg Convention is a subsidiary 
one. To get access to the Strasbourg Court a complainant must first bring his case before the national 
courts, if he has a remedy and in principle, but not necessarily, up to the highest court. This is not only 
a matter of efficiency, of allowing cases to be solved, so as to diminish the workload of the Strasbourg 
Court. The national legal system should first be given full possibility to correct the human rights 
problem, if there is any, the national courts being responsible in the first place to provide for the 
necessary legal protection, including the protection of fundamental rights. Now precisely in that 
regard, the EU legal system is more complex because of the dual nature of its legal protection. EU law 
will normally affect citizens only indirectly through implementing national law and measures taken by 
the national administration. As a consequence of this decentralized system of administration, legal 
protection is also largely decentralised: it must be obtained through the national courts, in cooperation 
with the CJEU through the preliminary ruling procedure. The possibility for private parties to have 
direct access to the Union courts is the exception. Since the Treaty of Lisbon this dual nature of the 
system of legal protection against unlawful EU acts (and national acts incompatible with EU rules) is 
explicitly recognized by the EU Treaty (Article 19 (1)). 
Now, what is the problem, one could ask? If legal protection must be obtained on the national level, 
the complainant, as always, has first to pass through the national courts to get access to the Strasbourg 
Court. Well, the problem is that this access could then be obtained without the Luxemburg Court 
having had the possibility to address the issue. It seems difficult to accept and at the same time hardly 
compatible with the rationale of the exhaustion of legal remedies principle, that the Strasbourg Court 
could be addressed to judge directly or indirectly the conformity of a Union act with the Convention 
without the CJEU having been able to examine the issue. Indeed it is the Luxemburg Court that has, 
within the legal system from which the act emanates the jurisdiction and the responsibility to ensure 
respect of fundamental rights. The Member States’ courts, as far as the validity of Union acts is 
concerned, do not have that jurisdiction.
41
  
                                                     
40
 See more generally on this issue A.Tizzano, “Les Cours européennes et l’adhésion de l’Union à la CEDH”, Il Diritto 
dell’Unione Europea 1/11, p. 29. 
41
 CJEU, Foto-Frost, C-314/85 (1987) ECR 4199. 
  
 
What about the preliminary ruling procedure? That procedure is indeed the only possibility to 
involve the CJEU before the case is brought to the Strasbourg Court. However, that procedure is not in 
the hands of the parties, it is not a remedy but a prerogative of the national court. A last instance Court 
is of course in principle obliged to refer but only if that Court detects a question of interpretation or 
validity of Union law which must be answered to solve the case and without prejudice to the 
exceptions of ‘acte clair’ and ‘acte éclairé’. It cannot at all be excluded that a case brought before the 
Strasbourg Court appears at that stage to raise serious questions about the conformity of a Union act 
with the Convention without the CJEU having been involved and even without the national court of 
last instance having necessarily infringed its obligation to refer.  
It seems to me that once the Union is a party to the Convention, the principle of exhaustion of legal 
remedies must be applied in a very specific way. Namely, even when an action of the Union can only 
be challenged indirectly through the national courts, in principle, where serious questions of validity of 
a Union act are involved, the CJEU must first have been able to examine that question before the 
Strasbourg Court judges the case. It would seem to me difficult to accept, to give an example, that 
questions of respect of fundamental rights of such importance as raised in cases like Bosphorus,
42
 
Kadi
43
 or Advocaten van de Wereld,
44
 would be decided by the Strasbourg Court without the CJEU, 
which has the competence to examine the validity of the Union act in question, having had the 
opportunity to address these questions. 
Another argument sometimes invoked to justify the introduction of a procedure of prior 
involvement relates to the monopoly of the CJEU to assess the validity of Union acts. I agree with 
those who consider this argument as not being really convincing. Indeed, a decision of the Strasbourg 
Court will not interfere with that monopoly. The Strasbourg Court will not judge the validity of Union 
acts, just as it does not do that with regard to national acts. Were that Court to judge a Union act to be 
incompatible with the Convention, the interpretation of that act would remain the sole competence of 
the Luxemburg Court and the validity of that act would not be directly affected. It might even happen 
that the CJEU could interpret the incompatibility away by proceeding to a consistent interpretation. 
The advocates of the monopoly argument do not go so far as to contest the final jurisdiction of the 
Strasbourg Court to establish an incompatibility of a Union instrument with the Convention. 
Nevertheless, one wonders how prior involvement of the CJEU in a case results in that Court not 
finding a fundamental rights problem, but the Strasbourg Court subsequently comes to the opposite 
conclusion, this would then suffice to neutralize the monopoly argument. 
In May 2010, the CJEU published a Discussion Document endorsing the need for a procedural 
mechanism of prior involvement. This position of the CJEU is shared by the Strasbourg Court as 
follows from the Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris of 17 January 2011. The 
two Courts have made this position publicly known with explicit reference to the ongoing negotiations 
on accession between the Council of Europe and the EU.  
The draft Accession Agreement does now indeed provide for such a mechanism, at least the 
principle of such a mechanism, in Article 3(6). The Union will have to enact further rules to lay down 
the modalities of this procedure, which is now under consideration. The European Commission would 
seem to be the obvious candidate to be allowed access to this procedure, also the respondent Member 
State. They should have the possibility in those cases pending before the Strasbourg Court, which 
appear to raise serious questions of conventionality of a Union instrument, to bring those questions 
before the Luxembourg Court. Of course, the decision of the Luxembourg Court will not bind the 
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Strasbourg Court, whichwould have the final say. As the last sentence of the provision in the draft 
Accession Agreement puts it in diplomatic language: the mechanism shall not affect the powers of the 
Strasbourg Court. The mechanism should be flexible. A referral to the Luxembourg Court should not 
be automatic but reserved more particularly to cases where a serious question of conventionality 
arises, and that is to be appreciated by the European Commission or the other parties to whom 
standing would be granted. 
Legal doctrine is far from unanimous about the need for such a mechanism.
45
 One encounters more 
specifically three objections against introducing a procedure of prior involvement. 
A first objection is one of unequal treatment. It also happens, and not infrequently, that complaints 
are declared admissible by the Strasbourg Court without a national Constitutional or Supreme Court 
having first been addressed. This is certainly true. However, normally in such a situation at least a 
lower court of that State will have given judgment in the case. And that is precisely the difference: 
without prior involvement none of the competent EU courts would be addressed.  
A second objection is based on the argument that the insistence by the CJEU on the need of a 
mechanism of prior involvement is to be explained by its reluctance to accept the jurisdiction of the 
Strasbourg court as the last instance Court on fundamental rights issues. I would call this the bad faith 
scenario. This objection seems to me totally unfounded. Of course, the CJEU will accept the final 
authority of the Strasbourg Court after accession; this is the whole purpose of accession. 
In fact, the CJEU accepts this already now by fully recognizing the consequences of Article 52 (3) 
of the EU Charter of fundamental rights. According to this Article, as we have already seen, the 
Member States have unilaterally agreed to the obligation for the Union to respect Convention rights 
corresponding to Charter rights as a minimum level of protection. This obligation includes the 
interpretation of those corresponding Convention rights given by the Strasbourg Court as fully 
accepted by the Luxemburg Court.
46
  
If this bad faith scenario is true, one wonders how the President of the Strasbourg Court could have 
endorsed the need for a mechanism of prior involvement by subscribing on behalf of his Court to the 
Joint Communication of the 17
th
 January 2011 with the President of the Luxemburg Court (and how, 
for that matter, the drafters of the Draft explanatory report to the draft Accession Treaty could have 
written: ”The Joint Declaration by the Presidents of the two European courts (…) provided a valuable 
reference and guidance for the negotiation”).47 
And finally, would prior involvement of the Luxemburg Court indeed risk, so to say, pre-empting 
the decision of the Strasbourg Court? The ultimate decision will entirely remain in the hands of the 
latter Court. Personally, I have no doubt that after accession the relationship between both Courts 
could not be qualified in terms of constitutional or multilevel pluralism: the Strasbourg Court will 
have the final say and in so far be superior to the Luxemburg Court. But of course the existing 
cooperation and dialogue between both Courts, also through their case law, should be continued after 
accession or even increased to avoid unnecessary conflicts. This is also the message given by the 
drafters of the Lisbon Treaty (Declaration No. 2 on Article 6 para. 2 TEU).  
 
A third objection is to argue that if the dual system of legal protection in the EU is creating 
problems for the application of the subsidiarity principle under the Convention, this is an internal 
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problem for the EU and should be solved by the EU itself instead of burdening the Convention system 
with providing a solution - Let the EU first bring its own house in order before accession. I do not 
deny there is merit in this argument. However, one of the conditions for accession on the side of the 
Union as expressed in Protocol No 8 is precisely that the Accession Agreement “shall make provision 
for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law (…)”. If the non EU Contracting 
Parties of the Convention were not willing to accept this condition, there would be a major problem. 
Fortunately, this appears not to be the case, at least not now. Moreover, what should an internal EU 
solution to the problem have to imply? Strengthen the obligation to refer of last instance courts by 
amending Article 267 TFEU or providing for a remedy in that Treaty allowing private parties to bring 
a case before the CJEU in the absence of a preliminary reference by a last instance court? Neither 
would, in my view, be desirable, nor would it be realistic to open a debate about treaty amendments. 
This provision of the draft Accession Agreement allowing prior involvement of the CJEU has been 
integrated in the Article of the draft Agreement that regulates the co-respondent mechanism. That 
mechanism is a complex one; it is certainly going to raise delicate questions in practice. The idea in 
itself however is clear. Precisely because of the overlap in practice of Union law and national law as 
already mentioned, the Union should be able to participate as a co-respondent in a procedure brought 
against an EU Member State whenever the national measure brought before the Court is so closely 
related to Union law that the complaint indirectly puts into question the compatibility with the 
Convention of a provision of Union law. That provision could be part of secondary or primary Union 
law. 
The Member States may be also admitted as co-respondents in cases brought against the Union 
when the complaint calls into question the compatibility with the Convention of provisions of EU 
primary law. The involvement of Member States in such cases may be explained because of their 
capacity as Herren der Verträge. 
The status of a co-respondent is that of a party to the proceedings who will be bound by the 
judgment. This is of course the main advantage of and, at the same time, justification for the co-
respondent mechanism. In a situation where the dividing line between Member State and Union 
responsibility for a measure is unclear and the Strasbourg Court is not empowered to judge the issue of 
the division of competences between the Union and the Member State, the co-respondent mechanism 
allows the Court to leave that question open and, if necessary, condemn both jointly. The advantage 
for the complainant will be that he obtains a judgment, which is enforceable against both parties. As it 
is stated in the draft explanatory report “The co-respondent mechanism is (…) not a procedural 
privilege for the EU or its member States, but a way to avoid gaps in participation, accountability and 
enforceability in the Convention system”.48 The Court decides whether the conditions for being 
accepted as a co-respondent are being fulfilled. However, a Contracting Party cannot be drawn into the 
procedure as a co-respondent against its will. 
I limit my comments on this mechanism and the possibility of a prior involvement of the CJEU to one 
crucial question:What will happen in a case where a complaint is brought against the Union before the 
Strasbourg Court because of a violation of the Convention by a Union act, for instance a regulation, 
which the complainant has not and could not have appealed before the Union Courts because of a lack 
of standing? How should the subsidiarity principle be applied in such a case? Should the complainant 
have immediate access to the Strasbourg Court or should he await the implementation and application 
of the regulation in his Member State? In other words, if in such a case a complaint before the 
Strasbourg Court would be at all admissible, would the principle of exhaustion of legal remedies then 
not have to be applied so as to fully take into consideration the dual nature of the Union’s system of 
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legal protection that is either through the Union or the national Courts? If in my example the 
complainant would not have to wait for access to the national court, but could immediately bring a 
complaint against the regulation before the Strasbourg Court, would there not be a lacuna in the draft 
agreement because there would be no possibility for a prior involvement of the CJEU before the 
Strasbourg Court decides on the compatibility of the regulation with the Convention? 
 Future relations between the ECJ and the Strasbourg Court  
What will be the consequences of an accession of the EU to the Convention? Will it fundamentally 
modify the relationship between both Courts? Accession will, at least formally, bring a fundamental 
change: the Union will become subject to the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court. That will imply that 
the CJEU becomes subordinated to that jurisdiction. This would seem to be in line with the case law of 
the Court on the relationship between EU law and international law. The CJEU has in principle 
accepted that the EU legal order can be made subject to the jurisdiction of an international court in the 
EEA Opinion.
49
 The Lisbon Treaty has now removed the hurdle erected by Opinion 2/94 on the 
Human Rights Convention.
50
  
If the CJEU becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court, does that necessarily 
imply that the cooperation between both courts as it has developed until now, will change? To be more 
precise, would that mean the end of the Bosphorus case law? Most commentators regard this as a 
logical consequence of accession.
51
 The EU, as a matter of principle, acceding to the Convention on an 
equal footing with the other Contracting Parties,
52
 means that there would be no justification anymore 
to grant the CJEU preferable treatment above that of a Supreme Court of a Contracting Party.  
This sounds convincing but in my view the question is more complex. Prima facie it would seem 
rather paradoxical if the presumption of good behaviour accepted before accession would have to be 
abandoned because of accession. That good behaviour has certainly continued since the Bosphorus 
judgement was rendered, and even been improved. Convention rights in so far as they correspond to 
Charter rights now form part of primary Union law (Article 52(3) Charter), including their 
interpretation by the Strasbourg Court. And one should also take into consideration the practise of the 
CJEU in referring extensively to the Strasbourg case law expecting and hoping that this practice will 
be continued despite what has been said above. More generally, it seems at least a matter for 
discussion whether the CJEU as an international Court with jurisdiction covering 28 Member States, 
also in view of its close cooperative relationship with the Strasbourg Court, can be considered in a 
similar position as a Supreme Court of a Member State. 
On the other hand, the Strasbourg Court has accepted the Bosphorus standard of limited control 
only with regard to a situation in which a Member State’s action is not the result of an exercise of 
discretion but the consequence of the need to comply with legal obligations flowing from EU law. 
Moreover the Court took note of the fact that the international organization from which the relevant 
act emanated, could itself not be held liable under the Convention. So, there appears in the Bosphorus 
judgement also an element of trying to accommodate respect of obligations under the Convention with 
the necessity for a Member State to honour its Union obligations in order to alleviate the possible 
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tension between these two sets of obligations, which the Strasbourg Court could not solve. Accession 
will of course fundamentally change this uncomfortable situation. 
On balance, I would not exclude the possibility that the Bosphorus standard could survive 
accession, possibly in a more mitigated form. In any event, at least in my view, it would be in the 
interest of both Courts and more generally of the Union and the Convention regime, if the existing 
cooperation between both Courts would be continued and possibly further developed, also after the 
Union’s accession to the Convention. I might refer again to Declaration No 2 on Article 6, para. 2 
TEU. But the final say on these matters, including the fate of the Bosphorus case law, belongs to the 
Strasbourg Court. 
So, to answer the question raised in the title, yes, accession of the EU to the ECHR will certainly 
change the relations between the Strasbourg and the Luxemburg Court, the latter becoming formally 
subject to the jurisdiction of the former. What will bethe consequences for the existing dialogue 
between both Courts, including the fate of the Bosphorus leniency, remains however to be seen. 
